The right to equal protection further than any other human
Posted: Tue Feb 18, 2025 5:08 am
In mentioning Articles 26 and 1(1), the IACtHR stated that Brazil had failed to guarantee the exercise of the right to just and favorable conditions of work without discrimination. Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning does not refer to the conditions of work in that fireworks factory compared to other factories or other occupations in general, but rather to the lack of opportunities for the town’s population to access other kinds of labor. Accordingly, the IACtHR’s rationale for finding discrimination in this case seems to focus on Article 24 and on a broader notion of equality under this provision.
The IACtHR’s reasoning seems to be premised on the understanding that if domestic law and its application do not provide tangible possibilities for a group of individuals to rise from poverty and achieve material equality, then the law (or its implementation) does not offer equal protection and is therefore contrary to Article 24. The state may not, for instance, hide behind the argument that domestic law does not provide a right to a certain standard of living: if individuals are unable to achieve a standard enjoyed by the rest of the population due to repeated discrimination against the former, the law needs to actively address that situation and provide all with at least equality of opportunities.
This way, IACtHR framed Article 24 as a general right to material equality regardless of the law. Indeed, in this part of the judgment, the IACtHR did not mention any Brazilian law that was being applied unequally. The Court’s reasoning was entirely directed to poverty as a factor leading to structural discrimination and to a lack of better labor opportunities, hence 99 acres database breaching the right to equality. This contrasts with previous cases, in which Article 24 was only found to have been breached when a specific domestic law had been applied discriminatorily (for instance, here and here), whereas discrimination relating to the enjoyment of a Convention right due to the victim’s economic conditions was framed under Article 1(1).
The IACtHR’s rationale was criticized by Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi (paras. 99-115), who considered that, by not linking the violation of Article 24 to a domestic law, and instead to a general situation of inequality and marginalization, the IACtHR had unduly expanded states’ obligations under this provision.
Indeed, the IACtHR’s interpretation takes the scope of rights body has done. Although the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has interpreted the comparable provision in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as encompassing equal protection in relation to rights not enshrined in the Covenant, such as socioeconomic rights, application of this rule has been limited to situations which the state’s domestic law provides unequal treatment, or its benefits are applied unequally. As such, the ICCPR provision has not been understood as creating an obligation for states to pursue general material equality or opportunities to socioeconomic equality, but merely to guarantee that, when the law grants some kind of protection or benefit, all can enjoy it equally. Similarly, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has indicated that the right to equal protection under Article 3 of the African Charter related to the implementation of a specific law. Nor has Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights been interpreted so broadly as done by the IACtHR.
The IACtHR’s reasoning seems to be premised on the understanding that if domestic law and its application do not provide tangible possibilities for a group of individuals to rise from poverty and achieve material equality, then the law (or its implementation) does not offer equal protection and is therefore contrary to Article 24. The state may not, for instance, hide behind the argument that domestic law does not provide a right to a certain standard of living: if individuals are unable to achieve a standard enjoyed by the rest of the population due to repeated discrimination against the former, the law needs to actively address that situation and provide all with at least equality of opportunities.
This way, IACtHR framed Article 24 as a general right to material equality regardless of the law. Indeed, in this part of the judgment, the IACtHR did not mention any Brazilian law that was being applied unequally. The Court’s reasoning was entirely directed to poverty as a factor leading to structural discrimination and to a lack of better labor opportunities, hence 99 acres database breaching the right to equality. This contrasts with previous cases, in which Article 24 was only found to have been breached when a specific domestic law had been applied discriminatorily (for instance, here and here), whereas discrimination relating to the enjoyment of a Convention right due to the victim’s economic conditions was framed under Article 1(1).
The IACtHR’s rationale was criticized by Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi (paras. 99-115), who considered that, by not linking the violation of Article 24 to a domestic law, and instead to a general situation of inequality and marginalization, the IACtHR had unduly expanded states’ obligations under this provision.
Indeed, the IACtHR’s interpretation takes the scope of rights body has done. Although the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has interpreted the comparable provision in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as encompassing equal protection in relation to rights not enshrined in the Covenant, such as socioeconomic rights, application of this rule has been limited to situations which the state’s domestic law provides unequal treatment, or its benefits are applied unequally. As such, the ICCPR provision has not been understood as creating an obligation for states to pursue general material equality or opportunities to socioeconomic equality, but merely to guarantee that, when the law grants some kind of protection or benefit, all can enjoy it equally. Similarly, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has indicated that the right to equal protection under Article 3 of the African Charter related to the implementation of a specific law. Nor has Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights been interpreted so broadly as done by the IACtHR.