Moreover, the IACtHR also (to my mind, rightly) concluded that the Venezuelan action was discriminatory and affected the freedom of expression of the applicants “who signed the request of a referendum”, because a manifestation of their expression was restricted and the state action under examination had the “covert intention of silencing and discouraging political dissidence, since it was instrumentalized as a factor to set an example in the sense that persons who exercised that freedom were scared for having participated politically and were later illegitimately encouraged to recant or “repair” their signatures in the procedure created for that purpose by the National Election Council” (para. 158).
The Court also examined whether internal judicial action triggered Venezuelan responsibility on other grounds. The IACtHR analysed if the resolution of an amparo remedy presented by the applicants before domestic authorities was consistent with the standards of articles 8 –on due process guarantees— and 25 –on the right to judicial protection. The Court considered that Venezuelan judges also engaged the responsibility of their state because of the judges, in spite of having had the possibility and obligation of protecting the victims (para. 192), failed to do so as a result of their having rejected recordings and transcriptions of phone conversations with state agents on the basis of having regarded them as illicit. For the Court, deeming as illicit the only evidence that could “directly prove” (para. 195) the allegations of the applicants, without those judges having taken into account the public interest of the issue, affected their motivation and the bases of the resolution of the legal situation, thus affecting rights to justice and to an “effective judicial remedy of the alleged victims” (para. 196).
Lastly, as to the merits, it is worth taking into account the right to work. In spite of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights not having raised arguments on it in its application, the alleged victims did invoke it in the different domestic and regional procedural stages, and the state did refer to those allegations (para. 216). For all these reasons, the Court band database argued that “the parties had the opportunity to express their positions in relation to the facts” around the arguments on the right to work. Hence, considering article 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the jura novit curiaprinciple, the Court concluded that it was competent to examine if such right was respected (para. 219), and concluded that the deviation of power it found entailed the use of a contractual clause “as a veil of legality to conceal the actual aim of” a measure of reprisal against the legitimate exercise of human rights (para. 221), which was contrary to the right to work, that “includes the state’s obligation of ensuring the rights of access to justice and effective judicial protection, both in the public and private spheres of labor relations” (paras. 221 and 222).
Sanction those responsible for the deviation of power it declared (para. 232); to publish and circulate the findings of the Court and extracts of its decision, as it often requires (para. 233); and to reimburse reasonable litigation costs and expenses (para. 250). Having been the termination of contracts a central part of the discussion before the Court, it is interesting to note that the Court did not order the reinstatement of the applicants because it considered such measure as not appropriate in light of the circumstances of the case (paras. 237, 242), without further elaborating such conclusion –which may respond to the fact that others are carrying out the functions the applicants carried out, and further problems would be created or, perhaps, out of fear of further political retaliations if this had been ordered.